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BOUNDED RATIONALITY AND BOUNDED RELIABILITY: A STUDY OF NON-
FAMILY MANAGERS’ ENTREPRENEURIAL BEHAVIOR IN FAMILY FIRMS 
 
We use transaction cost economics to explain the individual-level entrepreneurial behavior of 
family and non-family managers in family firms. We argue that non-family managers exhibit 
lower entrepreneurial behavior than family managers, particularly after the founder’s 
departure from the business. Moreover, we identify an expanded set of factors through which 
family firms can facilitate non-family managers’ entrepreneurial behavior, including 
monitoring, incentives, distributive justice, access to the top management, and job control 
perceptions. We test these hypotheses in a sample of 296 family firm managers, contributing 
new insights on non-family managers and corporate entrepreneurship in family firms. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Corporate entrepreneurship is crucial for family firms’ long-term performance and survival 
(Eddleston, Kellermanns, & Zellweger, 2012; Kellermanns & Eddleston, 2006), and it 
critically depends on the individual-level entrepreneurial behavior of managers (Kuratko et 
al., 2005) - their willingness and ability to discover and exploit entrepreneurial ideas and 
opportunities (Hornsby et al., 2009). Because the necessary managerial knowledge and skills 
may not always be available within the business family, family firms must often tap into 
external managerial talent (Gedajlovic, Lubatkin, & Schulze, 2004). This indicates the 
relevance of non-family managers for family firms’ corporate entrepreneurship, but quite 
surprisingly, empirical evidence about differences in entrepreneurial behavior between family 
and non-family managers is very limited, and the literature on the drivers of non-family 
managers’ entrepreneurial behavior provides conflicting views. 
Scholars largely agree that family managers have strong motivations to act in the 
family firm’s best interest (e.g., Cruz, Gómez-Mejía, & Becerra, 2010) but provide two 
divergent views regarding non-family managers’ motivations and behaviors. Agency theory 
suggests that opportunism and adverse selection problems complicate the attraction and 
retention of capable non-family managers (Chrisman, Memili, & Misra, 2014) and restrict 
their participation in strategic processes (Patel & Cooper, 2014). Seeing non-family managers 
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as self-motivated agents, agency scholars highlight monitoring and incentives as means to 
align interests and foster non-family managers’ pro-organizational behavior (e.g., Chrisman 
et al., 2014). In contrast, stewardship theory challenges the opportunism assumption and the 
effectiveness of related agency control mechanisms (e.g., James, Jennings, & Jennings, 
2017). It argues that non-family managers have natural incentives to act in the best interest of 
the firm and its owners (e.g., Miller, Le Breton-Miller, & Scholnick, 2008), for instance by 
engaging in entrepreneurial and pro-organizational behaviors (Eddleston et al., 2012).  
Despite much research and debate, the extent to which non-family managers act as 
stewards or agents remains unclear. While stewardship will prevail over agency under 
specific conditions of family leadership and governance (e.g., Madison, Kellermanns, & 
Munyon, 2017; Miller, Minichilli, & Corbetta, 2013), family firms’ stewardship has been 
shown to apply to the firm’s financial assets but not to their relationships with non-family 
stakeholders (Neckebrouck, Schulze, & Zellweger, 2017). This unresolved dialectic has 
persisted without compromise, and the prevailing emphasis on opportunism may have 
overshadowed the importance of other important drivers of non-family managers’ behavior.  
To extend research beyond the agency-stewardship dialectic, we draw on recent work 
applying transaction cost economics (TCE) to family firms (Chrisman et al., 2014; 
Gedajlovic & Carney, 2010; Verbeke & Kano, 2010, 2012). TCE qualifies family firms’ 
human assets in terms of asymmetric contracting arrangements, socialization processes, and 
motivations between family and non-family managers (Verbeke & Kano, 2012), suggesting 
that family firms’ human assets require firm-specific investments in order to economize and 
create value from them (e.g., Gedajlovic & Carney, 2010). Thus, TCE replaces opportunism 
with two broader microfoundations of family and non-family managers’ behaviors (Chrisman 
et al., 2014; Kano & Verbeke, 2015): (1) bounded rationality, which suggests that regardless 
of their purported opportunistic tendencies, non-family managers will have lower ability than 
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family managers to understand the variety of family business goals and identify 
entrepreneurial opportunities that align with those goals; and (2) bounded reliability, which 
suggests that, over time, non-family managers are more likely to experience benevolent 
preference reversals and identity-based discordances, limiting their ability to comply with 
initial promises and leading to lower entrepreneurial behavior compared to family managers.  
Our analysis of 296 managers in family firms shows that non-family managers are 
generally less entrepreneurial than family managers, especially after the founder’s departure 
from the family firm. We also show that non-family managers’ entrepreneurial behavior 
varies depending on how family firms govern their human asset base and economize on 
bounded rationality and bounded reliability issues. Specifically, we find that traditional 
agency control mechanisms have mixed effects on non-family managers’ entrepreneurial 
behavior, whereas perceptions of distributive justice, access to top management positions, 
and perceived control over the job have a consistently positive effect.  
Our study advances current understanding of the microfoundations of corporate 
entrepreneurship in family firms (Zahra & Wright, 2011) by relaxing the rigid assumptions in 
the agency-stewardship dialectic and providing a basis for explaining the extent to which an 
entrepreneurial gap between family and non-family managers materializes in different types 
of family firms. Moreover, it contributes to the literature on non-family managers (e.g., Tabor 
et al., 2017) by explicating the theoretical mechanisms and related practices that create the 
conditions for non-family managers to effectively engage in entrepreneurial behavior.  
THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT AND HYPOTHESES 
Existing research on antecedents of corporate entrepreneurship in family firms has primarily 
focused on firm-level factors to explain differences between family and non-family firms and 
heterogeneity among family firms (e.g., Eddleston et al., 2012; Randolph, Li, & Daspit, 
2017). A critical antecedent of firm-level corporate entrepreneurship, however, is managers’ 
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individual-level entrepreneurial behavior. It refers to managers’ actions aimed at discovering 
and exploiting entrepreneurial ideas and opportunities (Smith & Di Gregorio, 2002), 
including the recognition and generation of innovative and entrepreneurial ideas (Burgelman, 
1983; Kraut et al., 2005) and every effort made to support and stimulate other employees in 
engaging in entrepreneurial initiatives (Kuratko et al., 2005), and is the means through which 
corporate entrepreneurship is actually practiced and put into action (Kuratko et al., 2005). 
Antecedents of individual-level entrepreneurial behavior include organizational 
factors such as management support, work discretion, reward systems, and time availability 
(Hornsby et al., 2002), and personal and psychological attributes (Sieger, Zellweger, & 
Aquino, 2013). Regrettably, prior research does not address the important differences 
between family and non-family managers, including contracting arrangements, socialization 
processes, and motivations (Patel & Cooper, 2014; Verbeke & Kano, 2010). These 
differences are acknowledged as a major distinctive feature of family firms’ human assets 
(Chrisman et al., 2007; Verbeke & Kano, 2012), but virtually no research has addressed their 
implications for the individual-level entrepreneurial behavior of managers in family firms.  
Agency and Stewardship Assumptions about Family and Non-Family Managers  
Some insights about the behaviors of family and non-family managers can be gained 
from research on the upper echelons of family firms. Scholars tend to assume that family 
managers are by nature emotionally attached and committed to their firm and its idiosyncratic 
values and goals (Corbetta & Salvato, 2004; Cruz et al., 2010). Although opportunistic 
behaviors may exist among family managers (e.g., Chrisman et al., 2007), they are commonly 
seen as stewards who will behave in the best interest of the family. For example, they are 
often exempt from agency costs associated with monitoring and control (Cruz et al., 2010; 
Gómez-Mejía, Nunez-Nickel, & Gutierrez, 2001). Moreover, they possess in-depth 
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knowledge about the firm and its business (Lee, Lim, & Lim, 2003), which benefits strategic 
decision making and enhances financial performance (e.g., Ensley & Pearson, 2005).  
Whether the same attributes extend to non-family managers is not as clear. On the one 
hand, scholars using agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) emphasize that non-family 
managers’ goals are in conflict with those of family owners; non-family managers will 
therefore exploit information asymmetries through shirking, consumption of perks, or 
behaviors that contradict the goals of family owners (Chua, Chrisman, & Bergiel, 2009; 
Gómez-Mejía et al., 2001). On the other hand, the assumption of agent opportunism is 
challenged by scholars using a stewardship theory view (Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson, 
1997), arguing that non-family managers are stewards who maximize their own utility by 
aligning their goals with those of the firm and its principals (Corbetta & Salvato, 2004).  
Unfortunately, consensus is still far from being reached (Chrisman et al., 2007; Miller 
et al., 2013). This unresolved agency-stewardship dialectic points to the overly rigid 
assumptions about the “model of man” underlying each of the two perspectives (Corbetta & 
Salvato, 2004). Thus, scholars have recently called for research that relaxes rigid assumptions 
in order to explain managerial behavior within organizations in which pro-organizational 
attitudes and self-serving motives coexist (e.g., Verbeke & Kano, 2012).  
Transaction Cost Economics and (Non-)Family Managers’ Entrepreneurial Behavior 
A more general explanation of family and non-family managers’ behavior is provided 
by the TCE-based theory of the family firm (Gedajlovic & Carney, 2010; Verbeke & Kano, 
2010). TCE is based on the concept of asset specificity, or the difficulty in transferring assets 
to alternative uses (Williamson, 1985). Because highly specific assets allow one party 
involved in a transaction to extract superior rents at the expenses of other parties, TCE 
suggests that firms have advantages in developing and exploiting highly specific assets inside 
the firm rather than through other governance arrangements (Williamson, 1985).  
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Applied to family firms, TCE suggests that family managers are a special class of 
assets that is firm-specific, easy to deploy to alternative uses, but difficult to buy or sell 
(Gedajlovic & Carney, 2010). These attributes stem from their early socialization within the 
family firm, which provides the opportunity to develop highly specific knowledge about the 
firm and its goals (Lee et al., 2003; Verbeke & Kano, 2012). As family managers can be 
easily exploited inside the family firm but cannot be easily traded, family firms are motivated 
to make firm-specific investments that reduce their employment and compensation risk 
(Chrisman et al., 2014; Gedajlovic & Carney, 2010). In contrast, non-family managers do not 
have the same opportunities to develop firm-specific knowledge (Verbeke & Kano, 2012) 
and have greater mobility in the job market (Chrisman et al., 2014), suggesting that family 
firms will be reluctant to invest in these assets. For example, family firms are found to offer 
lower compensation and worse employment conditions to non-family members than non-
family firms (Neckebrouck et al., 2017) and adopt insider-oriented hiring and promotion 
policies (Lee et al., 2003; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2001). This, in turn, explains their difficulty to 
hire and retain capable non-family managers (Chrisman et al., 2014).  
In sum, TCE emphasizes the special features of family firms’ human asset base and 
the unique contracting relationship between family owners and family managers as compared 
to typical employment contracts with non-family managers. Interestingly, the focus on family 
firms’ human asset specificity provides a broader explanation of differences in family and 
non-family managers’ motivations and behaviors that goes beyond the disputed assumption 
of managerial opportunism in the agency-stewardship debate. Specifically, rather than trying 
to explain managers’ likelihood of engaging in pro-organizational behavior only as an 
expression of opportunism (or lack thereof), the TCE perspective introduces two core micro-
foundations of managerial behavior: bounded rationality and bounded reliability.  
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Bounded Rationality. Bounded rationality suggests that managers have inherent 
cognitive limitations that restrict their ability to know all the alternatives, account for 
uncertainty about exogenous events, and calculate the consequences of their decisions 
(Simon, 1979). Given their limited ability to process information, managers cannot maximize 
a given utility function, but use cognitive shortcuts such as satisficing and heuristics, which 
inevitably create errors and biases (e.g., Foss & Weber, 2016).  
Extending bounded rationality to family firms implies that non-family managers are 
not simply less willing than family managers to align their behavior to the goals of the family 
firm because of self-interest and opportunism, but that they may fail to do so because they 
face greater challenges in understanding the wide array of economic and non-economic goals 
of family owners (Chrisman et al., 2014). The early socialization of family managers is likely 
to reduce bounded rationality problems because it gives them the opportunity to more deeply 
understand and appreciate its particularistic goals (Gedajlovic & Carney, 2010), to overcome 
information asymmetries through close contact (Fang et al., 2016), and to develop deep tacit 
knowledge of the family firm’s value proposition and potential customers (Lee et al., 2003). 
Thus, they can base their decisions on intuitive or particularistic criteria that better align with 
the goals of the family firm. On the contrary, because non-family managers do not benefit 
from the same socialization processes, they need to put greater cognitive efforts in order to 
fully understand family firms’ non-economic goals (Mitchell et al., 2003). It follows that, 
compared to family managers, non-family managers will find it harder to understand whether 
pursuing certain entrepreneurial opportunities would be in line with the family’s desires and 
the family businesses’ overall strategy, and they may fail to behave in the best interests of 
family owners even if they are in good faith.  
Bounded Reliability. Bounded reliability introduces another reason why managers 
may fail to behave in the firm’s best interest that does not necessarily imply intentional 
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deceit. Specifically, it suggests that managers may experience good faith reprioritization of 
commitments due to benevolent preference reversals (i.e., temporal discounting biases that 
lead managers to place a lower value on future outcomes than on more proximate outcomes) 
and identity-based discordances (i.e., contradictions between initial commitments and 
managers’ personal or professional identity) (Verbeke & Greidanus, 2009). 
Extending bounded reliability to family firms suggests that non-family managers are 
more likely to engage in good faith reprioritization than family managers (Kano & Verbeke, 
2015). First, family managers’ commitments are less likely to diminish over time because of 
their longer time orientation and long-term goals such as passing a wealthy firm to the next 
generation of family members (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2005). Non-family managers do 
not have the same long-term orientation; hence, they are more likely to postpone initial 
commitments and identify alternative options over time which may offer more immediate 
benefits, to the point that the initial commitments can no longer be fulfilled. Family managers 
have also the opportunity to develop experiential knowledge over long periods of time, which 
can reduce evaluation biases and overcommitment. Boundedly rational non-family managers, 
in turn, are more likely to make too many commitments in response to the variety of family 
firms' goals, which are more likely to be scaled back ex post (Kano & Verbeke, 2015).  
Second, non-family managers may feel part of the business but not of the family 
system, leading to a greater likelihood of identity-based discordances compared to family 
managers (Kellermanns & Eddleston, 2004). Family managers are likely to identify more 
strongly with the family ﬁrm and are therefore more likely to maintain a strong identity fit 
over time (Deephouse & Jaskiewicz, 2013). By contrast, non-family managers are likely to 
embrace an identity characterized by professionalism, financial orientation, and emotional 
distance (Block, 2011). Over time, this identity may conflict with non-family managers’ 
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initial good faith commitment to fulfill the family goals, leading to a greater likelihood of 
breach of contract or unfulfilled promises in good faith (Kano & Verbeke, 2015).  
 
 
Differences in Entrepreneurial Behavior between Family and Non-Family Managers  
Irrespective of opportunism assumptions, the TCE perspective thus suggests that the 
combination of bounded rationality and bounded reliability will limit non-family managers’ 
ability and willingness to engage in entrepreneurial behavior compared to family managers. 
First, bounded rationality limits non-family managers’ understanding of the family firm’s 
economic and non-economic goals; thus, they are likely to experience greater challenges 
compared to family managers to understand whether pursuing certain entrepreneurial 
opportunities would be in line with the family’s desires and the family businesses’ strategy. 
This, in turn, is likely to reduce their ability to engage in entrepreneurial behavior compared 
to family managers. Second, due to bounded reliability, non-family managers are more likely 
to experience benevolent preference reversals and identity-based discordances because they 
do not have the same long-term orientation and identification with the family system as 
family managers. Therefore, even if non-family managers make good faith commitments to 
engage in entrepreneurial behavior, they are more likely to scale them back over time. Thus:  
Hypothesis 1a. In family firms, non-family managers exhibit lower entrepreneurial behavior 
than family managers.  
The application of TCE to family firms’ human assets also suggests that the degree to 
which bounded rationality and bounded reliability issues materialize is not the same in all 
family firms (e.g., Verbeke & Kano, 2012). In particular, we expect that there will be 
important differences between founder-generation and later-generation family firms. 
Family firm founders embody a stronger entrepreneurial identity, implying a greater 
emphasis on ensuring that the business survives and grows before it is possibly passed on to 
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later generations (Le Breton-Miller & Miller, 2013). Therefore, they are likely to outline 
clearer and more unified goals for non-family managers, which should ameliorate the latter’s 
bounded rationality issues. Founder-generation family firms are also less likely to suffer from 
bounded reliability issues because as family firm founders have made a critical contribution 
in creating and growing the firm, their competence and expertise is unlikely to be questioned 
(Miller et al., 2013) and they are less likely to be concerned about giving non-family 
managers greater career opportunities. It follows that non-family managers are more likely to 
believe that they will be able to enjoy the positive effects of their own entrepreneurial 
behavior and the resulting firm-level corporate entrepreneurship in the long run, thereby 
reducing the likelihood of benevolent preference reversals. Also, seeing a future in the family 
firm should reduce the likelihood of identity-based discordances over time.  
After the family founder leaves the firm and hands over the business to later 
generations, however, family firms are progressively imbued with family-specific attributes 
through the gradual involvement of later-generation family members in leadership positions. 
In this process, the family founders’ strong desire for growth is likely to be superposed by an 
increasing number of non-economic goals (Kotlar et al., 2017; Miller et al., 2011) which 
likely increases non-family managers’ bounded rationality issues. Likewise, we expect that 
also bounded reliability issues will become more pronounced after the family founder’s 
departure from the business. First, given the higher number of family business goals, non-
family managers are more likely to overcommit to multiple goals, increasing the risk of 
benevolent preference reversals. Second, as family members’ perceptions of belonging 
(Zellweger & Astrachan, 2008) and their identification with the family firm (Deephouse & 
Jaskiewicz, 2013) increase over the family firm’s lifecycle, family firms are likely to attach 
greater importance to the family identity, leading to a higher possibility that non-family 
managers experience identity-based discordances over time.  
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Thus, because non-family managers’ bounded rationality and bounded reliability are 
likely to intensify after the family founder has left, we expect that the entrepreneurial gap 
between family and non-family managers will be greater in later-generation family firms:  
Hypothesis 1b. The gap in entrepreneurial behavior between family and non-family 
managers is smaller in family firms where the family founder is still involved in the firm 
compared to family firms where the family founder has left the business.   
Heterogeneity of Non-Family Managers’ Entrepreneurial Behavior 
The TCE perspective not only provides an explanation for why non-family managers 
may engage in lower entrepreneurial behavior compared to family managers, but it also 
suggests that non-family managers’ entrepreneurial behavior is likely to vary depending on 
how family firms govern their human asset base (Gedajlovic & Carney, 2010) and economize 
on bounded rationality and bounded reliability issues (Verbeke & Kano, 2012). Specifically, 
TCE provides a basis to understand heterogeneity among non-family managers by refining 
our existing understanding of how traditional agency control mechanisms (i.e., monitoring 
and incentives) may work in relation to non-family managers’ willingness and ability to 
exhibit entrepreneurial behavior. Also, TCE allows us to introduce other governance 
mechanisms previously overlooked in the agency-stewardship literature, such as perceptions 
of distributive justice, access to top management positions, and perceived job control.   
Monitoring. The agency literature emphasizes the importance of agency cost control 
mechanisms in order to align non-family managers’ goals and curb unproductive behaviors 
(e.g., Chrisman et al., 2004; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2001). Monitoring is described as an 
accountability mechanism limiting information asymmetries and constraining non-family 
managers’ ability to pursue self-serving goals (Eisenhardt, 1989). Thus, it should ameliorate 
opportunism issues and encourage non-family managers to act in the best interest of family 
owners. However, monitoring is primarily concerned with improving the odds of good 
outcomes and reducing the odds of bad ones, which may lead non-family managers to 
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become defensive, adopt shortened time horizons, and favor low-variance projects (e.g., 
Goranova et al., 2017). Also, non-family managers may interpret monitoring as distrust, 
‘second-guessing’, or lack of respect from the family (e.g., McDonald & Westphal, 2010), 
which can reduce their willingness to engage in entrepreneurial behavior (e.g., Zahra et al., 
2004).  
While agency theory provides mixed insights into the effect of monitoring, TCE 
refines this view by emphasizing the value of monitoring not only as a goal-alignment 
mechanism but also as an efficient way to economize on family firms’ human assets by 
addressing non-family managers’ bounded rationality and bounded reliability issues (e.g., 
Chrisman et al., 2014; Verbeke & Kano, 2012). First, monitoring can help family firms 
economize on bounded rationality issues by making family owners’ goals more explicit and 
easy to understand by non-family managers, thereby helping them recognize when 
entrepreneurial behavior aligns with the family firm’s goals. Second, monitoring can also be 
an efficient way to economize on bounded reliability issues because it allows family firms to 
continuously inform non-family managers about changes in goals and priorities and to 
provide feedback and guidance regarding their behavior over time (e.g., Langfred, 2004). 
Therefore, it reduces the possibility that non-family managers make unrealistic commitments 
and experience benevolent preference reversals. Similarly, monitoring is likely to improve 
non-family managers’ ability to commit to the family firm’s goals in the long term by helping 
family firms detect potential conflicts between non-family managers’ professional identity 
and their expected behavior, which reduces the emergence of identity discordances that could 
lead to good faith reprioritization of commitments. Given the positive effects of monitoring 
on non-family managers’ bounded rationality and bounded reliability issues we propose: 
Hypothesis 2. In family firms, non-family managers engage in greater entrepreneurial 
behavior under higher levels of monitoring. 
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Incentives. Another important set of agency cost control mechanisms relates to 
monetary incentives for managers in the form of share ownership (e.g., Martin, Gómez-
Mejía, & Wiseman, 2013) or performance-based pay (Eisenhardt, 1989). Like monitoring, 
agency theory suggests that monetary incentives reduce information asymmetries, align 
goals, and motivate non-family managers to engage in behaviors that benefit the family and 
the business. We argue that the same mechanisms can help ameliorate bounded rationality 
and reliability issues, thereby facilitating non-family managers’ entrepreneurial behavior.  
First, share ownership as a form of equity-based pay links managers’ income directly 
to the measures of firm success that are relevant to family owners, and is therefore seen as a 
powerful mechanism to align goals and incentives between firm owners and managers 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Next to ameliorating agency conflicts, share ownership can help 
non-family managers reduce bounded rationality issues by facilitating their understanding of 
family owners’ goals and priorities, thus enabling them to engage in entrepreneurial actions 
that benefit both the family and the business. Moreover, the observation that non-family 
managers are often concerned about the lack of equity in their compensation (Poza, Alfred, & 
Maheshwari, 1997) suggests that share ownership can address bounded reliability issues. 
Indeed, ownership provides non-family managers with a claim on a share of the future 
growth of the family firm’s market value and thus incentivizes them to take strategic actions 
that can potentially increase the firm’s value in the long term (Martin et al., 2013). Therefore, 
the provision of ownership shares to non-family managers will likely increase the long-term 
commitment of non-family managers and reduce the likelihood of benevolent preference 
reversals and identity-based discrepancies over time. For these reasons, we expect:  
Hypothesis 3a. In family firms, non-family managers engage in greater entrepreneurial 
behavior when they own shares of the family firm.  
Second, prior agency theory literature suggests positive effects of performance-based 
pay on agency costs in family firms (e.g., Chrisman et al., 2004; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2001). 
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TCE further illuminates how performance-based pay can address bounded rationality and 
bounded reliability problems. Specifically, the TCE perspective suggests that non-family 
managers are likely to be particularly concerned with asymmetric compensation policies 
driven by family owners’ aversion to dilute family control (e.g., Block, 2011; Gedajlovic & 
Carney, 2010; Verbeke & Kano, 2012). The use of performance-based incentives can reduce 
these concerns and resolve the cognitive ambiguity entailed by the family firm’s variety of 
goals. Thus, performance-based pay can help non-family managers overcome ambiguity and 
risk aversion. Moreover, performance-based pay is likely to increase non-family managers’ 
beliefs that they will be rewarded for their entrepreneurial activity and success (Hornsby et 
al., 2002), suggesting that they will adopt an extended temporal window to evaluate their 
actions and related outcomes, which should in turn reduce the likelihood that they scale back 
their initial commitment to the family firm’s goals over time. Accordingly, we propose:  
Hypothesis 3b. In family firms, non-family managers engage in greater entrepreneurial 
behavior when they receive performance-based pay.  
Importantly, the TCE perspective suggests that family firms can address the 
challenges associated with family-based human asset specificity by economizing on various 
expressions of bifurcation bias in human resource practices (Verbeke & Kano, 2012). 
Examples are adopting human resource practices that embody unbiased family values, 
including justice and equality among owners and managers. Accordingly, we now turn to 
non-family managers’ perceptions of distributive justice, their access to top management 
positions, and job control perceptions to assess the drivers of within-non-family manager 
heterogeneity with regard to entrepreneurial behavior.  
Perceptions of Distributive Justice. Organizational justice research suggests that 
issues related to the distribution of outputs such as equality (equal treatment of the parties in 
reward decisions) and equity (fairness in view of the parties’ contributions) drive managers’ 
ability and willingness to engage in pro-organizational behaviors (e.g., Colquitt, 2001). 
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Specifically, managers are more concerned about the fairness of rewards than their absolute 
level (Colquitt, 2001); they compare their own input/output ratio to that of others and 
perceive inequity when the ratios are unequal (Barnett & Kellermanns, 2006; Sieger, 
Bernhard, & Frey, 2011). These perceptions of justice (or injustice), in turn, have important 
effects on the relationship between managers and their firms and on managers’ attitudes 
toward the firm (Folger & Cropanzano, 1998). It follows that family firms can economize on 
their human asset specificity by promoting perceptions of distributive justice, which will 
enhance the ability and willingness of non-family managers to support the achievement of 
family goals.  
Applied to non-family managers, their awareness that they are part of the business 
system but not of the family system is likely to create a heightened sensitivity to equality 
issues (Barnett & Kellermanns, 2006). It follows that their perceptions of injustice can 
jeopardize their ability to appreciate the diversity of family firm goals and, thus, intensify 
bounded rationality problems. Moreover, perceptions of distributive justice can also help 
family firms economize on bounded reliability problems. Specifically, such perceptions 
facilitate non-family managers’ ability to commit to actions – such as entrepreneurial 
behavior – that enhance the family firm’s long-term performance because they increase their 
confidence that they will benefit from it. Moreover, stronger perceptions of distributive 
justice likely make non-family managers believe to be treated as insiders, which can help 
family firms remove faultlines between family and non-family members in the firm (Patel & 
Cooper, 2014), thereby ameliorating the risk of identity-based discordance. We thus state:  
Hypothesis 4. In family firms, non-family managers engage in greater entrepreneurial 
behavior when they perceive a higher level of distributive justice within the firm. 
Access to Top Management Positions. Scholars have long recognized that family 
owners are reluctant to delegate control to non-family managerial staff and technical 
specialists (e.g., Carney, 2005; Chrisman & Patel, 2012). This, in turn, can lead to a greater 
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bifurcation bias in family firms’ human assets, implying limited opportunities for career 
progression for non-family managers (Chrisman et al., 2014; Verbeke & Kano, 2012). Thus, 
providing opportunities for non-family managers to access top management positions can be 
an effective way to economize on bounded rationality and bounded reliability issues.  
First, it allows family firms to economize on bounded rationality issues because it 
provides non-family managers with easier access to crucial information for decision-making 
as well as greater confidence in seeking more information when required (e.g., Hambrick & 
Mason, 1984). Relatedly, managers’ beliefs regarding coordination and control play a critical 
role in enabling corporate entrepreneurship in family firms (Zahra et al., 2004; Zellweger & 
Sieger, 2012). Therefore, we expect that non-family managers in top management positions 
will be less exposed to information processing problems emanating from bounded rationality 
and will be better positioned to pursue entrepreneurial initiatives. Second, non-family 
managers’ access to top management positions can also help economize on bounded 
reliability issues and reduce the likelihood of benevolent preference reversals. Specifically, 
non-family top managers will be more likely to feel responsible for their actions and maintain 
their commitment over time. Moreover, they will be more likely to see their future career in 
the family firm; thus, they will act consistently in the family firm’s best interest over time. 
For example, Poza et al. (1997) observe that “confidence in the future is important for these 
managers, yet it is not always easy” (p. 144). Conversely, if competent non-family managers 
are excluded from top managerial responsibilities, they may identify entrepreneurial 
opportunities that align more closely with their professional identity, triggering identity-based 
discordances that may lead them to start their own firm or to leverage the opportunity by 
obtaining a better position in the job market (e.g., Campbell et al., 2012). We thus state:  
Hypothesis 5. In family firms, non-family managers engage in greater entrepreneurial 
behavior when they occupy a top management position.  
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Control perceptions. Control perceptions over the job and work environment refer to 
the degree to which managers perceive latitude and freedom of action to make decisions and 
delegate responsibilities to lower-level managers and workers, which does not necessarily 
reflect their formal job title (Hornsby et al., 2002). Business families’ desire to maintain 
concentrated family control (Carney, 2005; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007) may limit non-family 
managers’ degree of control and work discretion that are required for entrepreneurial 
experimentation (Kuratko, Ireland, & Hornsby, 2001). Therefore, control perceptions are 
likely to be an important economizing mechanism for addressing bounded rationality and 
bounded reliability issues and to facilitate non-family manager’s entrepreneurial behavior.  
First, lack of control is a common motive limiting individuals’ information-processing 
capabilities and leading to illusory pattern perceptions (e.g., Whitson & Galinsky, 2008). 
Greater control perceptions can thus foster non-family managers’ ability to appreciate the 
family firm’s diverse set of goals and preferences. Also, higher control perceptions should 
encourage non-family managers to scan the external and internal environments and detect 
work-related problems at an early stage, leading to a greater ability to identify entrepreneurial 
opportunities that align with the family firm’s goals. Second, these perceptions can 
ameliorate bounded reliability issues by helping non-family managers identify appropriate 
and achievable goals within a clearly defined time frame. For example, control perceptions 
correlate positively with employees’ well-being and ability to cope with stress (e.g., Logan & 
Ganster, 2005); this, in turn, should reduce non-family managers’ likelihood of scaling back 
on previous commitments or experience identity-based discordances. In sum, we propose:  
Hypothesis 6. In family firms, non-family managers engage in greater entrepreneurial 
behavior when they perceive greater control over their job and working environment.  
METHOD 
Sample and Data Collection 
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Our dataset has been created to investigate managers’ attitudes and behaviors (Sieger 
et al., 2011; Sieger et al., 2013). In 2009, we acquired email addresses of managers from the 
two largest professional address data providers in Switzerland and Germany. Focusing on 
“senior managers” (heads or directors of different departments) allowed us to randomly 
retrieve 10,750 valid email addresses. Using an identification-based online survey and one 
reminder email, we achieved a response rate of 9.5%, similar to other studies on senior 
managers (e.g., Capron & Mitchell, 2009). Out of these 1024 respondents, we only selected 
those who indicated that a family was the majority shareholder and that they would describe 
their company as a “family business”, obtaining a final sample of 296 complete responses.  
Measures 
If not mentioned otherwise, all Likert-type scales range from 1 = strongly disagree to 
7 = strongly agree. To translate the measurement instruments from English into German, we 
followed a back-translation procedure with two independent bilingual experts.1 
Dependent variable. To measure entrepreneurial behavior, we use the same six-item 
instrument as Sieger et al. (2013). It focuses on the core essence of individual-level 
entrepreneurial behavior which includes managers’ actions to discover and exploit 
entrepreneurial opportunities (Smith & Di Gregorio, 2002) through identifying new means to 
create new businesses or reconfigure existing ones (Hornsby et al., 2009), scanning the 
environment for opportunities and threats (Kraut et al., 2005), recognizing, surfacing, and 
generating ideas by observing market and competition (Shepherd, McMullen, & Jennings, 
2007), as well as helping others to act entrepreneurially (Kuratko et al., 2005). The six items 
proposed by Sieger et al. (2013) are all based on previous empirical studies (Eddleston & 
                                            
1 A detailed list with all items and respective factor loadings is available from the authors.  
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Kellermanns, 2007; Dyer et al., 2008; Pearce et al., 1997). The six items loaded on one factor 
only, with factor loadings of 0.631 or larger (Cronbach’s Alpha = 0.83)2.  
Independent variables. Non-family managers were identified with the question “Are 
you a member of the owning family?” (“yes” = “0”, “no” = “1”). Founder involvement was 
assessed with the question “Is the founder of the company still working in the business?” 
(“yes” = “1”, “no” = “0”). Monitoring was assessed with four items from Chrisman et al. 
(2007). These items loaded unidimensional with factor loadings of at least 0.572. Cronbach’s 
Alpha was 0.71. Share ownership was based on the question “Are you a partner or owner of 
your company, or do you hold shares in your company?” (“yes” = “1”, “no” = “0”). 
Performance-based pay referred to the question “Is a part of your compensation depending 
on performance (e.g., bonus, profit share)?” It thus indicates whether a performance-based 
pay system is existing for the respondent or not. Also here, “yes” answers were coded “1”, 
“no” answers with “0”. To capture whether managers were occupying a top management 
position, the respondents were asked to self-report their managerial level (Hornsby et al., 
2009) by responding to the question “Please indicate which hierarchy level best describes 
your position”. 78 percent indicated “top management/member of the management board” 
(coded “1”). 22 percent indicated management positions outside the management board, in 
line with the initial selection criterion described above (coded “0”). For distributive justice, 
we used a validated German version (Maier et al., 2007) of the established measurement 
instrument from Colquitt (2001). Our four items loaded unidimensional with factor loadings 
of at least 0.933; Cronbach’s Alpha was 0.96. The perceived job control instrument is based 
                                            
2 Sieger et al. (2013), who use a larger sample of managers from both family and non-family firms, report a 
Cronbach’s Alpha of 0.83 as well. The items loaded on one factor only with factor loadings of 0.64 or higher. In 
addition, Sieger et al. (2013) demonstrated discriminant validity with a measure of corporate entrepreneurship 
(Eddleston & Kellermanns, 2007) and convergent validity with the entrepreneurial behavior measure of Pearce 
et al. (1997) and the innovative behavior measure of Dyer et al. (2008). We replicated the same analyses in our 
sample and found almost identical results, confirming both discriminant and convergent validity.  
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on the scale of Pierce et al. (2004). The eight items loaded on one factor (factor loadings of at 
least 0.63; Cronbach’s Alpha = 0.84).  
Control variables. We controlled for firm age and size (full-time equivalent 
employees) as well as for respondents' age, gender (“0” for female and “1” for male), the 
number of weekly working hours, and tenure (see Hornsby et al., 2009; Sieger et al., 2013). 
Also, we controlled for managers’ psychological ownership toward their firm (Pierce et al., 
2004; Sieger et al., 2013). The seven items loaded on one factor with factor loadings of 0.605 
or higher; Cronbach’s Alpha was 0.87. In addition, we used dummy variables for the most 
prevalent industry sectors in our sample, as the competitive environment of a company may 
impact entrepreneurial activities (manufacturing, construction, services, tourism, and other). 
Finally, we added a measure for environmental dynamism using four items from Achrol & 
Stern (1988), with loadings of 0.597 or higher and a Cronbach’s Alpha of 0.70.  
Data quality tests 
To test for non-response bias, we compared early and late respondents as well as 
respondents who completed the whole survey and those who dropped out before completion 
using ANOVA (Oppenheim, 1966), and found no significant differences. To address 
potential common method bias, we first conducted Harman's one-factor test (Podsakoff et al., 
2003) which revealed that no factor explained more than 14.17 percent of the variance. A 
confirmatory factor analysis (Podsakoff et al., 2003) with all our independent, moderator, and 
dependent variables shows that the corresponding structure exhibits an acceptable fit (χ2(293) 
= 541.338, CFI = 0.917, RMSEA = 0.054).3 These findings suggest that our measures are 
empirically distinguishable and that common method bias is unlikely to be a major concern. 
The Variance Inflation Factor does not exceed 1.689, which indicates that multicollinearity is 
                                            
3 A CFI value of 0.9 or higher indicates acceptable model fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999), and a RMSEA value of 0.06 
or smaller indicates good fit (Browne & Cudeck, 1993). The results of a one-factor structure are significantly 
worse (χ2(324) = 2322.186, CFI = 0.329, RMSEA = 0.145; difference in χ2 = 1780.848, df = 31, p < 0.001). 
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not an issue (Hair et al., 2006). Social desirability concerns are mitigated because respondents 
were assured strict confidentiality and anonymity; also, the study variables were spread over 
the comprehensive survey to prevent respondents from anticipating potential research 
questions and adapting their answers accordingly (Podsakoff et al., 2003).  
RESULTS 
Means, standard deviations, and Pearson correlations appear in Table 1. With one exception 
(share ownership versus non-family manager status), the correlations of our independent, 
moderator, and dependent variables are clearly below or only very slightly above 0.3 in 
magnitude, which indicates no obvious shared variance concern (Hair et al., 2006). 
Insert Table 1 around here 
 
Our hypotheses are tested with OLS regressions in the whole sample (family and non-
family managers, N = 296, Hypotheses 1a and 1b, Table 2) and in the subsample of non-
family managers (N = 260, all other hypotheses, Table 3). Specifically, Hypothesis 1a is 
tested in Model 2 of Table 2. Non-family manager status is negatively and significantly 
related to entrepreneurial behavior (β = -0.111, p < 0.05), which offers support to Hypothesis 
1a. The interaction between non-family manager status and founder involvement in Model 4 
is significant and positive (β = 0.144, p < 0.05), which is in line with Hypothesis 1b (see also 
the interaction plot shown in Figure 1).  
Insert Table 2 and Figure 1 around here 
 
In Model 6 in Table 3, monitoring has a positive and significant relationship with 
non-family managers’ entrepreneurial behavior (β = 0.155, p < 0.05), which offers support to 
Hypothesis 2. Hypotheses 3a and 3b, however, have to be rejected because neither share 
ownership (β = 0.033, p > 0.05) nor performance-based pay (β = 0.028, p > 0.05) are 
significant (Models 7 and 8, respectively). In Model 9, distributive justice is positively and 
significantly related to our dependent variable (β = 0.170, p < 0.01), which confirms 
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Hypothesis 4. Hypothesis 5 finds support as well because having a top management position 
is significantly and positively related to entrepreneurial behavior (β = 0.209, p < 0.01; Model 
10). Hypothesis 6 can also be supported (Model 11) as the coefficient of perceived job 
control is positive (0.162) and significant (p < 0.01). This pattern of findings is confirmed in 
Model 12 where we added all our independent variables. Whenever a coefficient (or 
interaction term) is significant, the change in R2 is significant as well (see Models 2 and 4 in 
Table 2 and Models 6, 9, 10, 11, and 12 in Table 3). Taken together, we are able to confirm 
Hypotheses 1a, 1b, 2, 4, 5, and 6, while we need to reject Hypotheses 3a and 3b.  





We use TCE to advance the agency-stewardship dialectic and provide a broader and more 
flexible understanding of family and non-family managers’ entrepreneurial behavior. 
According to our theorizing about family firms’ human assets, firm-specific investments, and 
ensuing bounded rationality and reliability issues, we found a gap in entrepreneurial behavior 
between family and non-family managers. This gap, in turn, is smaller in family firms with 
the family founder still involved and increases after the founder’s departure. Further, we 
investigate the drivers of non-family managers’ heterogeneity in entrepreneurial behavior by 
elucidating how specific safeguarding mechanisms (i.e., monitoring, incentives, perceptions 
of distributive justice, access to top-management positions, and job control perceptions) 
allow family firms to economize on bounded rationality and bounded reliability issues.  
Our study makes two main contributions to the literature. First, building on TCE, we 
advance an understanding of corporate entrepreneurship in family firms that goes beyond the 
traditional agency-stewardship dialectic and enables developing more nuanced predictions of 
differences in entrepreneurial behavior between family and non-family managers. Shifting 
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focus from firm-level corporate entrepreneurship to the individual-level entrepreneurial 
behavior of managers in family firms allows shedding light on hidden but important 
dynamics. In particular, our study demonstrates the value of TCE in order to explain why, 
irrespective of agency versus stewardship assumptions regarding their opportunistic 
motivations (Corbetta & Salvato, 2004), non-family managers may have both lower ability 
and willingness to engage in entrepreneurial behavior compared to family managers due to 
bounded rationality and bounded reliability. Thus, we provide a richer understanding of the 
“microfoundations” of corporate entrepreneurship (Zahra & Wright, 2011) in family firms, 
suggesting that the specificity of family firms’ human assets and the ensuing bounded 
rationality and bounded reliability issues (Chrisman et al., 2014; Gedajlovic & Carney, 2010; 
Neckebrouck et al., 2017) are critical to understanding bifurcation biases (e.g., Verbeke & 
Kano, 2012) and entrepreneurial gaps between family and non-family managers.  
Relatedly, our study clarifies the boundary conditions of the TCE perspective on 
family firms’ human assets. Specifically, it suggests that the bifurcation bias underlying the 
entrepreneurial gap between family and non-family managers is lower when the family 
founder is still involved in the firm. Both founders and later generation family leaders have a 
variety of economic and non-economic goals, but the former have a greater ability to resolve 
potential goal conflicts than the latter (e.g., Miller et al., 2011). Thus, non-family managers’ 
lower entrepreneurial behavior compared to family managers is not driven by goal conflicts 
as much as by their difficulty to understand the goal diversity of family firms and commit to 
such a complex set of goals over time. These findings also complement the notion that family 
businesses tend to become less entrepreneurial across generations (see, for instance, De 
Massis et al., 2013; Naldi et al., 2007). Taken together, our theory and findings demonstrate 
the value of TCE as a complementary perspective through which scholars can obtain a more 
nuanced understanding of corporate entrepreneurship in family firms.  
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Second, by building on bounded rationality and bounded reliability as 
microfoundations of managerial behavior, our study explicates the heterogeneity among non-
family managers in family firms. The emerging literature on that group (e.g., Chrisman et al., 
2014; Fang et al., 2016) has used the TCE perspective to explain the unique challenges that 
family firms face in recruiting and retaining non-family managers. By shifting the level of 
analysis from the firm to the managers working for it, we extend this view to provide a 
template that can be used to understand how, once family firms hire non-family managers, 
they can create the conditions for them to work effectively (e.g., Neckebrouck et al., 2017) 
and engage in pro-organizational behaviors such as entrepreneurial behavior (e.g., Eddleston 
et al., 2012). On the one hand, our study shows mixed evidence concerning the effectiveness 
of agency control mechanisms. On the other hand, our study points to an extended set of 
mechanisms such as perceptions of distributive justice, access to top management positions, 
and perceived job control, that appear to consistently remove barriers to non-family 
managers’ entrepreneurial behavior. These findings have important implications for theory 
and research on non-family managers in family firms, as discussed next. 
Although we hypothesized that monitoring and incentives – two traditional agency 
control mechanisms typically associated with goal alignment – would help curb managerial 
opportunism as well as ameliorate bounded rationality and bounded reliability issues, our 
results supported this argument only with regard to monitoring. One explanation might be 
that share ownership and performance-based pay may effectively help curbing opportunism, 
but not the other facets of bounded rationality and bounded reliability discussed in our 
theoretical development. It follows that opportunism is indeed not the only or main reason for 
non-family managers’ commitment failure in relation to entrepreneurial behavior. For 
example, performance-based pay may provide financial incentives to behave in ways that 
increase firm performance and firm value, but they do not ensure that non-family managers 
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fully understand the complexity of the diversity of family firm goals and maintain their 
commitment to such goals, which are often intangible in nature, difficult to assess, and 
continuously changing over time. Monitoring, on the opposite, appears to be more effective 
in addressing opportunism as well as bounded rationality and bounded reliability problems. 
Future research is needed to further disentangle the different effects of monitoring and 
incentives in relation to opportunism, bounded rationality, and bounded reliability issues.  
By contrast, we provide consistent evidence about the importance of organizational 
justice (e.g., Colquitt, 2001), fair participation in decision-making and career opportunities 
(Chrisman et al., 2014; Verbeke & Kano, 2012), and delegation of responsibilities (e.g., 
Hornsby et al., 2002) as primary mechanisms to ameliorate non-family managers’ bounded 
rationality and bounded reliability issues and boost their ability and willingness to engage in 
pro-organizational behaviors. Therefore, our study provides new insights about the drivers of 
heterogeneity in non-family managers’ behavior and about the actual policies and practices 
through which family firms can economize on their human asset specificity to encourage pro-
organizational behaviors. Future research can build on these insights to further refine our 
understanding of recruitment and retention of non-family managers in family firms 
(Chrisman et al., 2014; Fang et al., 2016). For example, the expanded set of economizing 
mechanisms we identified could help refine our current understanding of the conditions under 
which family firms are perceived as good or bad employers by non-family managers (e.g., 
Neckebrouck et al., 2017) as well as to explain heterogeneity among family firms in terms of 
relevant outcomes such employee absenteeism, turnover, and performance.  
Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
Our work is not free of certain limitations, which, in turn, open up promising avenues 
for future research. The cross-sectional survey data does not allow us to derive definite 
conclusions with regard to the direction of causality of our investigated relationships. Hence, 
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we call for studies that test the same relationships with longitudinal data. Also, our responses 
stem from managers in family firms located in Switzerland and Germany. Although the core 
assumptions of TCE - bounded rationality and bounded reliability - should be rather 
independent of the cultural and institutional context, studies in other countries and cultures 
would be welcome. They could address, for example, differences between collectivistic and 
individualistic cultures, which would allow to assess the extent to which non-family 
managers’ behavior is driven by bounded rationality and bounded reliability as opposed to 
opportunism. Also, our subsample of family managers is rather small; using a larger sample 
and delving into within-family manager heterogeneity is thus certainly promising.  
Next to the limitation-based possibilities for future research, our paper opens up 
numerous other promising paths. First, we strongly encourage future research to investigate 
additional drivers of differences in individual-level entrepreneurial behavior between family 
and non-family managers. For our purposes, the TCE literature on bounded rationality and 
bounded reliability issues (Verbeke & Kano, 2012) has been proven to be very helpful, but 
alternative theoretical perspectives may provide further insights concerning, for example, the 
role of organizational culture, the overlap of values, or social identities (e.g., Sieger et al., 
2016). Second, we advocate further research on the drivers of non-family managers’ 
entrepreneurial behavior as such. For instance, the effectiveness of the application of more 
stewardship-related mechanisms (e.g., James et al., 2017) or the combination of agency and 
stewardship mechanisms (Madison et al., 2017) may deserve further research attention, 
especially in relation to the microfoundations of different governance configurations and their 
consequences for individual-level behavior. Third, we believe that applying a TCE 
perspective to the family firm context bears huge potential in general (Gedajlovic & Carney, 
2010; Verbeke & Kano, 2010). It could be used to investigate various interesting motives, 
behaviors, and outcomes within the family firm, in the entrepreneurship context and beyond.  
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CONCLUSION 
Taking a TCE perspective and building on the concepts of bounded rationality and bounded 
reliability, we provide intriguing insights concerning the entrepreneurial gap in 
entrepreneurial behavior between family and non-family managers as well as about different 
factors accounting for heterogeneity in entrepreneurial behavior among non-family managers. 
We do hope that our work provides inspiration and guidance for future research to address 
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FIGURE 1 






Means, Standard Deviations, and Pearson Correlations 
    Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 




















2 Firm size 1317 8126 .02 1 
3 Age 45.78 8.58 .01 -.01* 1 
4 Gender 0.23 0.42 .00 .12* -.22** 1 
5 Weekly working hours 49.47 13.46 -.02 -.00 -.04 -.26** 1 
6 Tenure 13.42 9.79 .05 -.07 .56** -.10 -.01 1 
7 Psychological ownership 4.54 1.29 .03 -.04 .20** -.15* .06 .16** 1 
8 Manufacturing 0.61 0.49 .00 -.10 -.03 .02 -.12* -.09 -.10 1 
9 Construction 0.10 0.30 .02 -.04 .06 -.07 -.00 .00 .08 -.41** 1 
10 Services 0.02 0.13 .14* -.00 -.03 .05 -.01 -.06 .02 -.16** -.04 1 
11 Tourism 0.02 0.13 -.06 -.01 .02 -.01 .12* .04 -.01 -.16** -.04 -.02 1 
12 Other industries 0.05 0.22 -.01 .23** -.10 .06 .02 .01 .02 -.29** -.08 -.03 -.03 1 
13 Environmental dynamism 4.37 1.07 -.08 .06 .02 .03 .01 .05 -.08 -.00 -.25** .10 .00 -.05 1 
14 NFE status 0.88 0.33 -.11* .05 .01 .10 -.02 -.12* -.07 .04 -.05 .05 -.11 -.06 .05 1 
15 Founder involvement 0.21 0.41 -.38** .08 -.08 .08 .06 -.11 -.05 -.03 -.03 .06 -.00 .00 .01 .11* 1 
16 Monitoring 4.12 1.10 .03 .03 .02 .02 .09 -.08 .02 .05 .02 .10 -.12* -.06 .18** -.01 -.02 1 
17 Share ownership 0.15 0.36 .11 -.01 -.05 -.03 .06 .11 .14* -.08 -.05 -.06 .09 .07 -.01 -.56** -.15* 0.03 1 
18 Performance-based pay 0.64 0.48 -.05 -.06 .10 -.29** .19** .01 .17** -.05 -.09 -.07 .04 -.05 .10 -.06 -.11 0.07 0.09 1 
19 Distributive justice 4.93 1.32 .00 .05 .05 .09 -.03 .04 .23** -.13* .06 .03 -.02 -.02 -.01 -.05 -.10 .13* .15* .14* 1 
20 Top management 0.78 0.41 .01 -.14* .19** -.40** .13* .06 .25** -.07 -.02 .01 .07 -.03 .02 -.12* -.01 0.04 0.11 .30** .13* 1 
21 Perceived job control 5.75 0.89 .04 -.22** .17** -.03 .08 .10 .15** -.11 .13* .07 .01 -.12* .05 -.04 -.04 .13* 0.06 0.11 .17** 0.06 1 
22 Entrepreneurial behavior 5.00 0.98 .04 .04 .18** -.18** .20** .10 .25** -.18** .01 .10 -.02 -.04 .13* -.11 -.00 .21** .17** .17** .23** .31** .22** 
N=296. S.D.=standard deviation. * and ** indicate significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 2 
Results of Regression Analysis (Full Sample) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 










Control variables         


































Psychological ownership 0.203 *** 0.197 *** 0.198 *** 0.198 *** 
























Other industries -0.095 
 
-0.103 † -0.103 † -0.119 * 
Environmental dynamism 0.116 * 0.117 * 0.117 * 0.104 † 
         
Independent variables         
Non-family manager status 
  
-0.111 * -0.111 * -0.069 
 
Founder involvement 





         
Interaction term         
Non-family manager status X 
founder involvement       
0.144 * 
         
Model fit indices     
Adjusted R2 0.146 0.155 0.152 0.167 
Delta R2 
 
0.011* 0.011 0.018* 
Model of comparison 
 
Model 1 Model 1 Model 3 
F statistics 4.869*** 4.853*** 4.516*** 4.703*** 
N=296. Standardized beta coefficients reported. †, *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1%, and 





Results of Regression Analysis (Non-family Manager Subsample) 
 
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
 


















Control variables                 






































































Psychological ownership 0.190 ** 0.186 ** 0.187 ** 0.186 ** 0.150 * 0.148 * 0.180 ** 0.110 † 































































Environmental dynamism 0.117 † 0.083 
 
0.116 † 0.114 † 0.118 † 0.110 † 0.107 † 0.079 
                  




          
0.121 * 
Share ownership 
    
0.033 




      
0.028 




        
0.170 ** 
    
0.120 * 
Top management 




Perceived job control 
            
0.162 ** 0.144 * 
         
Model fit indices         
Adjusted R2 0.14 0.159 0.137 0.137 0.164 0.172 0.16 0.214 
Delta R2 
 
0.022* 0.001 0.001 0.026** 0.034** 0.023** 0.089*** 
F statistics 4.235*** 4.502*** 3.943*** 3.934*** 4.629*** 4.836*** 4.535*** 4.721*** 
N=260. Standardized beta coefficients reported. The model of comparison is always Model 5. †, *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1%, and 0.1% levels, 
respectively. 
